Mohamed Suleiman Al Shazly
After more than 18 months of war in Sudan, international stances have begun to shift, including Russia’s, which in 2024 aligned itself with the countries supporting the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). This shift can be traced to the 2019 coup, which ousted President Omar al-Bashir. This change was supported by many actors including Russia, which aftermath provided crucial backing to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), including military assistance and strategic advice, to help stabilize the new regime. On the diplomatic arena, Russia and China blocked a UN Security Council resolution condemning the RSF’s deadly crackdown on protesters in June 2019, justifying the violence as necessary for maintaining stability.
The connection between a foreign private military company and Sudan strengthened significantly when mercenaries began assisting the Sudanese government during the suppression of large-scale protests in 2018. These operatives and the private company have provided training to Sudanese security forces and offered strategic guidance on countering dissent, including tactics involving disinformation campaigns and media manipulation to discredit protest movements. As public demonstrations intensified in response to worsening economic conditions and widespread human rights violations, the government’s crackdown grew increasingly violent, with reports emerging of foreign involvement through mercenaries and military support in these actions.
In 2023, Sudan descended into a full-scale conflict between the SAF and RSF. Russia’s role as a supposed peace mediator became increasingly problematic as Wagner mercenaries were shown to be directly involved with the in the conflict. While Russian officials expressed concern over the violence, their continued support for a specific party appeared to cast doubt on their credibility as impartial mediators. While this backing was neither officially acknowledged nor publicly confirmed, it raised questions about their neutrality in the situation.
Russia’s broader influence in Africa, especially in countries like Sudan, Mali, and the Central African Republic, has capitalized on weaknesses in Western policies and sanctions. Moscow has leveraged these opportunities to gain political, diplomatic, and economic leverage from authoritarian regimes, but this often comes at a high human cost.
Some reports indicate that the central element in Russia’s growing influence in Sudan has been the country’s vast gold resources. M-Invest, a company connected to the Wagner Group, secured mining rights in Sudan, allowing Russia to extract valuable gold.
Russian arrival to assist Sudanese forces, and Sudan’s involvement in peace talks for the Central African Republic made it a critical part of Russia’s strategy in the region. The ties between Russia and Sudan deepened in 2017 after the US lifted sanctions on Sudan. Omar al-Bashir traveled to Sochi to meet with President Vladimir Putin, seeking support against the US continues pressures. In return, Russia offered military support in return of access to critical resources, including gold and establishment of naval base in Port Sudan.
As Sudan’s political crisis unfolded, Russia’s support for al-Bashir and his successors contributed to the country’s instability. Following the 2019 coup, mercenaries, linked to Wagner and its affiliate Meroe Gold, became involved in the illicit gold trade. When the US imposed sanctions on Meroe Gold, Sudanese officials created a new front company, Al-Solag, to continue these operations covertly. Despite efforts to curb this trade, Sudan’s military government, after staging a coup in 2021, disbanded the anti-corruption committee that had uncovered these illicit activities, silencing opposition to the gold smuggling operations.
With the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, Sudan’s gold became crucial for both parties as a means to bypass international sanctions and fund its war effort. Sudan further aligned with Russia, abstaining from UN votes condemning Moscow’s actions in Ukraine and even granting approval for a Russian naval base on its shores. Despite public concerns about the violence in Sudan, Russia’s continued support for the military regime and its backing of the RSF exacerbated the crisis, leading to even greater suffering for the Sudanese people.
Growing foreign influence in Africa reflects a broader strategy that capitalizes on the weaknesses of Western engagement and the effects of sanctions. In nations such as Sudan, Mali, and the Central African Republic, external powers have provided political and military support to governments, creating new alliances. However, these partnerships often come with significant humanitarian costs. Support for oppressive regimes exacerbates violence, corruption, and human rights abuses in these regions. While positioning themselves as alternatives to Western influence, these external actors reveal contradictions by promoting authoritarian governance while decrying foreign interference. Ultimately, it is the citizens of these nations who suffer the most, bearing the brunt of these exploitative policies.
Mohamed Suleiman Al Shazly is a Sudanese-British novelist, short story writer, and media professional.
Mohamed Suleiman Al Shazly is a Sudanese-British novelist, short story writer, and media professional.
